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To summarise the conclusions of this paper: 
1.  Pakistan not only has to deal with a cash flow problem, it also has to make 
the difficult structural adjustment of living within its means, after nearly 50 
years of failing to do so. 
2.  Despite large resource inflows and periods of good economic management 
Pakistan’s per capita growth has been less than half of that in rapidly 
growing Asian economies. The country has therefore failed to reduce 
poverty as much as it could have. 
3.  This performance was the result of inadequate export growth, savings and 
attractiveness to foreign private investment. Two periods of good 
economic management show the impressive potential of the economy. 
4.  The heart of an appropriate economic strategy is to make non-traditional 
exports more profitable. 
5. It is appropriate to emphasise the need for further decontrol and greater 
reliance on the market. But government has an important role in providing 
infant industry incentives for exports and compensating for externalities. 
6.  To maintain political support for reforms government must allocate fairly 
the pain and gains, and reduce corruption. 
 
A.  SHORT-TERM CRISIS AND SERIOUS 
NEW STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 
It is by now widely accepted that Pakistan faces an immediate crisis in finding 
the foreign exchange to meet its debt and other obligations. But there is less 
recognition that there is also a long-term structural imbalance that requires a 
structural solution. 
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1.  The Short-term Foreign Exchange Crisis 
The short-term crisis is well recognised and being dealt with. Moreover any 
comments can quickly be outdated by events. A few remarks will therefore suffice. 
Since macroeconomic imbalances are related, one can look at the situation from 
different perspectives. The Balance of Payments is perhaps the easiest to understand. 
The State Bank (1996) estimates the current account deficit for this year at about 6.6 
percent, while a later World Bank estimate is for the even more daunting 7.2 percent 
(1997). This deficit has 2 major elements: 
  — a deficit on trade and services account, that is imports of goods and services 
greater than exports; 
  — the need to pay interest on the debt which the Pakistan government (and 
private entities) have incurred. 
Somehow this deficit has to be covered, because the cost of defaulting on debt is too 
great. Foreign official transfers are likely to cover only 1 percent on a net basis, 
leaving 5.6–6.0 percent to be met from remittances and from other items in the 
capital account. 
But the capital account adds to the problem. The Pakistan government has 
commercial debts which are falling due this year and need to be paid. Moreover, past 
current account deficits have been partly financed for some years by volatile inflows 
of: 
 —  Portfolio  investment. 
  — Foreign currency Deposits from residents and non-residents. 
  — Short-term foreign borrowing from the capital market through a variety of 
devices, and by drawing down foreign exchange reserves. The reserves are 
now too low. They need to be high under current circumstances because 
substantial sums can quite readily flow out again. 
A largely convertible currency and a capital account that is quite open greatly 
increases both the likelihood and the cost of macroeconomic instability and changing 
expectations. When large sums of money can and do slosh in and out of a country a 
country needs far larger foreign exchange reserves and is highly vulnerable to 
changes in perceptions and expectations. When expectations turn sour, exchange 
reserves of a billion dollars can quite quickly be wiped out, as short-term debt is not 
rolled over, dollar deposits are withdrawn, remittances decline and net inflows of 
portfolio investment change from positive to negative. Yet Pakistan’s foreign 
exchange reserves have generally been less than one billion dollars recently (about $ 
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Pakistan’s reserves have been particularly vulnerable recently. It is not well-
covered in the international press. But three stories were widely covered and affected 
international investors and lenders: 
  — Ethnic strife and crime in Karachi earlier and political instability in 1996. 
  — Pakistan’s listing  as the second most corrupt country in the world, the most 
corrupt in Asia. It is ironic that some Asian competitors escaped notice 
because they were not among the top five in corruption and many newspapers 
listed only the top five. The difference between the second and sixth most 
corrupt is not very meaningful, since these evaluations are highly subjective. 
But it became meaningful to bankers and investors if only the top five were 
mentioned in the media. 
  — The business press covered the downgrading of Pakistan’s debt by one 
ranking service. 
These three reports increased the volatility of Pakistan’s foreign exchange flows and 
the need to maintain large reserves to meet debt servicing needs, the trade and 
services deficit and any short-term outflows of funds. 
It is always possible to deal with the short-term problem of increasing both the 
reserves and the confidence of depositors and investors by cutting back sharply on 
imports and government investment and raising interest rates. Indonesia when faced 
with a similar problem took steps which resulted in short term interest rates of 100 
percent. That brought an immediate repatriation of funds, cut imports as stocks and 
working capital became very costly, and encouraged an inflow of funds. The short-
term costs of such measures are substantial since they are likely to result in a 
shrinking of the economy and a sharp drop in investment. 
The alternative is to increase short-term borrowing from other countries, the 
IMF and foreign banks to provide reserves sufficient to reassure lenders, investors 
and those who deposit foreign exchange in the banking system. This strategy as well 
has substantial short-term costs. Foreign banks are unlikely to lend without the 
assurance provided by an IMF agreement and even so will now demand higher 
interest costs than a year or two ago. The IMF will insist on a stabilisation 
programme, that will also curtail demand/income and raise prices. The immediate 
contractionary costs of stabilisation may be less, but only at the cost of aggravating 
long term problems. The short-term debt would increase and with it the debt 
servicing costs. 
 
2.  Confusing the Effects of Stabilisation 
and Those of Reforms 
Both approaches then tend to be contractionary, sharply but temporarily 
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income. Both also tend to include a reduction in the government deficit, partly by a 
decline in some subsidies, and a devaluation. The poor are hurt by the slow-down in 
the economy and accelerating inflation [Papanek (1996) and below]. Prices rise more 
rapidly because of the withdrawal of some subsidies and the standard devaluation. 
In Pakistan as elsewhere a reform programme is often launched at the same 
time as the stabilisation effort. Reforms are seen as painful, and are therefore 
accepted as politically possible only when the government has its back against the 
wall, precisely the time when stabilisation is also needed. The decline in the 
consumption of the poor, greater than that of most other groups, is then blamed on 
the reform by those opposed to the reforms, although it is really caused by the 
stabilisation effort. 
In fact, sensible reforms which accelerate growth benefit the poor. It is 
stabilisation, usually made necessary by profligate governments which should, but 
rarely is, blamed. (For a more detailed discussion of this point and evidence 
supporting it see Papanek 1996.) 
In Short, whatever government is in power in 1997, it will not be able to avoid 
imposing a stabilisation programme. If it is a traditional stabilisation effort then it 
will cause shrinkage of the economy and pain for the majority of the population and 
especially for the poor (but see below). The pain should not be blamed on the 
reforms that should take place at the same time but on the excessive spending of 
previous governments. 
 
3.  Living Beyond Its Means Since Independence 
Pakistan’s problem, however, is not just a short term liquidity crisis. Rather it 
is also structural. Pakistan has been living beyond its means since Independence, 
except for some very brief periods. That is, it has consumed (and invested) more than 
it has produced, it has imported more than it has exported. The Balance on Current 
Account, a good measure, has shown an inflow of foreign resources of 6 percent of 
GDP or higher most years since the 1960s (see Table 6 (b)). 
First the gap between consumption/production and imports/exports was met 
by Sterling balances. Then came a brief period when Pakistan was able to live within 
its means because of the Korean war boom in the prices of goods it exported. This 
was followed by a period of great austerity. Then foreign aid met the gap, later 
supplemented by remittances. Finally Pakistan was able to borrow at negative real 
rates of interest, which means loans were a minimal burden. 
All these inflows were largely “unrequited”. That is, Pakistan did not have to 
pay for them. World Bank loans, for instance, had to be repaid. But with only a 1 
percent charge, a 10 year grace period and 25 years to repay, their real cost to the 
economy were small. Inflation meant that their servicing cost was a fraction of their 
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4.  The Need for Structural Reform—Facing a Changed World 
Pakistan now faces a different situation and will have to adjust by carrying out 
fundamental structural reforms in addition to a stabilisation programme to meet a 
liquidity crisis. 
 
(a)  The End of Large Unrequited Transfers 
Pakistan’s ability to finance its gap at low cost came to an end some years ago. 
Net foreign aid is now small (1 percent of GDP) and has higher cost. Remittances 
have declined. The resource gap has increasingly been financed by short-term 
commercial borrowing; by Foreign Currency Deposits (FCD) by both residents and 
non-residents; and by some Foreign  Private  Investment (FPI), both portfolio and 
direct. All these sources of funds are not unrequited. Depositors, lenders and 
investors expect a return and as the perceived risk has increased they expect an 
increasingly higher return [see Ahmed (1994)]. Moreover most of these funds are 
highly volatile. With the exception of FPI they can move out of the country rather 
quickly. 
Pakistan can continue to run a large deficit only if it can attract PFI which is 
used to finance investments that will generate sufficient income to pay both the 
interest  and profit which foreigners expect  and to repay  the principal when 
demanded. 
 
(b)  Accumulating Larger Reserves 
Over and above that Pakistan will have to produce and export enough to 
accumulate much larger foreign exchange reserves. The greater the reserves, the less 
vulnerable the country to a sudden  loss of confidence and the quick loss of foreign 
exchange. Inevitably  there will be periods  when confidence is dented by a bed 
harvest, a decline in world prices for the goods Pakistan exports or a rise in those it 
imports. The larger the reserves at that time, the less the cost to the economy in terms 
of very high interest rates or short-term stabilisation measures. 
 
(c)  The Need for Higher Growth 
A 6 percent rate of economic growth has been considered quite satisfactory in 
the  past and 7 percent was considered by some as excessively optimistic. But these 
are modest numbers if Pakistan  is to simultaneously: 
  — meet the rising expectations of middle and upper income groups who have 
done well for years, as the result of borrowed money; 
  — reduce poverty as rapidly as all parties  have promised; 
  — reduce the large debt burden which is hanging over Pakistan and which will 
result in periodic crisis if it is not reduced;—achieve  this reduction in debt Gustav F. Papanek  348 
without harsh stabilisation measures that cut consumption and fall most 
heavily on the poor. 
 
(d)  A More Competitive  Environment 
When Pakistan expanded its non-traditional exports in the 1960s it was doing 
so in a world where competition from other low-wage countries was limited. South 
Korea started on its reforms later than Pakistan. China, India, Indonesia and Thailand 
were not serious competitors. Indeed even at the end of the 1960s  only Korea among 
the larger countries was producing more manufactured exports than Pakistan (if 
population is taken into account; see Table 8). Pakistan was a leader in rapidly 
increasing manufactured exports. 
Now Pakistan is a laggard. In 1970 its manufactured exports were more than 
10 times those of Indonesia. In 1980 they were still triple those of the larger country, 
and more than 5 times on a per capita basis. Indonesia brought in a reform package in 
1986 and eight years later its manufactured exports were more than 3 times those of 
Pakistan. 
Now Pakistan must compete with China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Bangladesh, among other countries for a large, but still limited, pool of private 
investment funds and for markets. All these countries are reforming, all are becoming 
more competitive, and Pakistan’s labour costs are higher than in some of them. If 
Pakistan is to compete effectively it must move faster and smarter, it must again 
become a leader, rather than being a laggard. 
In short, Pakistan must deal with both a short term balance of payments crisis 
and a fundamental structural adjustment. For the first time in its history it needs to 
fully earn its way, balancing consumption with production and imports with exports 
and financing any gap which remains largely with foreign private investment that it 
must attract. And it must do so in a world in which there are many competitors for 
investment funds and markets that are also reforming their economies. 
 
B.  HOW WELL HAS PAKISTAN DONE? 
To put into perspective the task of dealing with the structural problem now 
faced by Pakistan one needs to examine the issue of how well the economy is 
performing. This question can only be answered in comparative terms. Compared to 
the country’s past performance and the handicaps under which the economy operates 
it is doing well. But compared to other economies in Asia and its own potential it is 
doing quite poorly. And the costs of lackluster performance are great. There are 
many more poor people in Pakistan and they are more miserably poor than they need 
and would be if the economy’s performance were better. Pakistan’s Development  349 
1.  Criteria of Success 
What is the criterion of success? There has been a gradual shift over the 
decades from almost exclusive preoccupation with growth to primary emphasis on 
poverty reduction. In the process there has been considerable debate on whether 
these are conflicting or consistent goals. 
By now the evidence is overwhelming that these are quite consistent goals in 
poorer countries. Poor countries are labour abundant and low wage economies. In 
these countries the most effective way for raising the income of the poor is to 
increase the demand for unskilled labour and, to a lesser extent, to reduce the supply 
of labour to the commercial or competitive sector. This was a major theme of two 
previous lectures or papers under PIDE auspices, so it is not worthwhile to address it 
in any detail [Papanek (1986, 1991)]. 
These and other papers have shown that rapid growth, as long as it is not 
distorted to make it unduly capital intensive, benefits the poor more than other 
groups. To put it into simplified quantitative terms: a correlation analysis for 6 
countries over 30 years comparing periods of rapid and slow growth shows that for 
every 1 percent increase in the rate of per capita growth real wages of unskilled 
labour increase by about 1.5 percent [Papenek (1989)]. When income distribution 
and poverty data are available they show the same relationship. The same paper also 
discusses why data for changes in the real wages of unskilled labour are a good 
proxy for changes in the income of the poor. 
The most recent work along these lines has been done for India, where poverty 
data are available for long periods and many individual years, and wage data for 
agricultural labour are quite reliable. As shown in Table 1, in the three periods when per 
capita GNP growth averaged over 3 percent per year, real wages increased at the very 
high average annual rate of nearly 9 percent. By contrast in the three periods when per 
capita GNP stagnated the real wages of agricultural workers declined on average by 4.5 
percent a year. In short, real agricultural wages increased by over 13 percent a year 
more rapidly in a growing than in a stagnant economy in India. 
Table 1 
Growth Rates and Changes in Real Wages in India, 1950s to 1990s 
(Annual Percentage Rate over Various Time Periods) 
  Average Change  
     Per Capita GNP Growth   in Real Wages of 
Range Average  Agricultural  Labour 
3.2% or more  3.7%  8.8% 
1.5 and 1.9%  1.6%  0.7% 
–1.1 to 1.3%  0.4  –4.5% 
Source: Reported in Papanek (1996) and calculated from Acharya and Papanek (1995).  Gustav F. Papanek  350 
The data on the proportion of persons below the poverty line are consistent 
with these findings. From 1980-81 to 1986-87 there was relatively rapid growth. 
During a roughly corresponding period (1977-78 to 1986-87) both rural and urban 
poverty declined by about 17 percent. Growth and poverty reduction were not 
conflicting objectives; consistently they went together. 
It is therefore quite reasonable, as a first approximation to Pakistan’s 
performance in poverty alleviation, to analyse the country’s performance in terms of 
the old criterion of the rate of growth. This is fortunate since there are reasonably 
good data on the rate of growth, but only sporadic data on changes in the number of 
poor people. Of course, to the extent that data are available, it is highly desirable to 
also analyse directly the effect of growth on poverty. 
 
2.  Pakistan’s Growth Performance in a Historical 
  and Comparative Perspective 
Over the 47 years from Independence through 1994-95 Pakistan has grown on 
average at 5 percent per year. But that growth has been quite variable, reaching 
nearly 7 percent in the 1960s after 3.5 percent in the 1950s (see Table 2). In the 
1990s growth has been at historical averages of 5 percent (for GDP at Factor Costs, 
but only 4.4 percent for GNP at Market prices for 1990-91 through 1995-96 [World 
Bank (1997)]. 
Compared to the other large countries in South Asia Pakistan’s growth has 
been remarkably high. Over 40-plus years for which good data exist, India has 
averaged 3.7 percent and Bangladesh 3.3 percent. Pakistan’s performance is 
especially noteworthy in comparison with India, which had a far better endowment 
of trained and experienced business and industrial managers, technicians and skilled 
labour, and higher literacy rates. India’s endowment of natural resources was also far 
superior, except for agricultural land. Nevertheless, Pakistan has grown more rapidly, 
except for the 1950s (Table 2). 
Pakistan’s performance is less impressive when it is analysed in per capita 
terms and is quite poor when compared with the successful East and Southeast Asian 
(ESEA) economies. The latter have grown at an average of around 8 percent since 
1965. With a population growth rate of only 1.5 percent since 1980 their per capita 
incomes have grown at over 6 percent. Their per capita growth has accelerated over 
time as population growth has fallen and in the 1990s has reached the remarkable 
rate of over 7 percent on average. Contrast that with Pakistan’s per capita growth of 
about 2.5 percent over the same 30 years period and only 2 percent in the 1990s. 
Clearly a 3 percent population growth rate, double that of the East and Southeast 
Asian (ESEA) economies, was a major factor in Pakistan’s slower per capita growth. 
The implications of slower growth are clear: At the current rate it takes 
Pakistan over 30 years to double its income per person while the fast-growers do it in Gustav F. Papanek  352 
10 years. The rapidly growing Asian economies have increased per capita income 
about 6-fold in a period when Pakistan only doubled it. 
 
3.  Pakistan’s Poverty Alleviation Performance 
Because of the correlation between a higher rate of growth and a more rapid 
reduction in poverty, Pakistan’s performance in poverty alleviation was good but not 
as good as in the more rapidly growing countries. Moreover, it varied with the rate of 
growth and was therefore better in some periods than in others. 
The most striking statistic is that between 1963-64 and 1990-91 the (real) 
income of the poorest 20 percent of the population increased roughly 2.5 times, after 
adjusting for inflation (Table 3). Most of the gain occurred during the two periods of 
rapid growth in the 1960s and the late 1980s. During the 12 years of rapid growth, 
per capita GDP increased about 70 percent but the income of the poor more than 
doubled (nearly 125 percent; see Table 4). Clearly growth benefited the poor more 
than the average person in Pakistan as well as elsewhere in the world. 
The data on the percentage of those under the poverty line is more ambiguous. 
One major problem is that the percent of poor has been calculated only for selected 
years and that no consistent time series exists even for those years. For the 1960s, 
where data exist for several years, analysts summarised in Table 3 do not always 
agree on conclusions. For other years there are fewer observations and firm 
conclusions would be hazardous. What one can say is that it is likely that the 
proportion of the poor declined both in the 1960s and the late 1980s and they may 
have increased in the early 70s. 
The wages of unskilled agricultural and construction labour usually provide a 
very good index of what has been happening to the absolute income of the poor. But 
data in this respect are poor in Pakistan compared to most countries. The World Bank 
(1995) concludes that the data show an increase of about 2 percent a year between 
the mid-70s and early 1990s for the Punjab. This is consistent with the increase in the 
income of the poorest 20 percent cited above. As in the case of the other data, a big 
increase in real wages (27 percent) came in the period of more rapid growth of 1978-
79 to 1986-87 and a smaller increase (15 percent) during the slower growth of 1986-
87 to 1991-92. Real wages stagnated thereafter. The same series for construction 
workers (this time an average for major cities) shows a 40 percent increase in the 
rapid growth 1960s, followed by stagnation in the slow growth early 1970s, followed 
by a 65 percent increase in the middle and late 1970s and stagnation to 1981-82 
when that series ends [Papanek (1989)]. 
In terms of time periods the wage data for Pakistan are therefore not 
inconsistent with those derived from the much broader Household Income and 
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that real wages are negatively affected by the rate of inflation and positively by 
growth in output (Ibid). These conclusions seem to hold for Pakistan as well. 
The main point, though, is that rapid growth (especially if accompanied by 
low inflation) is good for the poor. The reasons are obvious from Table 4. During the 
periods of rapid growth, income distribution improved. With both rapid growth in 
average income and improving income distribution, the income of the poor naturally 
rose quite rapidly. The facts in Pakistan simply do not bear out the argument that 
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Source: Calculated from Table 3. 
Note:    An increase in the Gini coefficient indicates greater inequality. 
 
4.  Poverty Alleviation in a Cross- 
country Perspective 
The World Bank concludes that Pakistan’s record in poverty alleviation was 
better than that of most countries, but lagged that of the rapidly growing countries of 
East Asia and Southeast Asia (ESEA). Its 1990 report showed that Indonesia and 
Malaysia reduced poverty substantially more rapidly than Pakistan, Thailand 
performed about equally well, while India and Sri Lanka did substantially less well. 
But it is well known that when it comes to other indicators of the welfare of 
the poor, Pakistan lags most of the other countries of South Asia as well. Tables 5 
and 6 give some of the data. But it is not useful to dwell on this at length because 
little new can be said; the dismal story is too well known. Pakistan’s Development  355 
Table 5 










 1994  1995  1980  1994 
Pakistan 60  62  124  92 
India 62  48  116  70 
Sri Lanka  72  10  34  16 
Bangladesh 57 62  132  81 
Indonesia 63  16  90  53 
Thailand 69  6  49  36 
Philippines 65  5  52  40 
Malaysia 71  17  30  12 
China 69  19  42  30 
S. Korea  71  0  32  12 
Source:  World Bank (1996). 
In Short, 
  (i) Pakistan’s rate of economic growth was the highest in South Asia over 40-
odd years; 
  (ii) but because of its high population growth its per capita growth was 
superior only to a smaller degree; 
  (iii) also Pakistan’s  per capita growth was less than half that of countries in 
East and Southeast Asia;   
  (iv) more important, its growth was highly variable.  When more appropriate 
policies were in effect, Pakistan’s growth in the 1960s exceeded the 
average for the countries of East and Southeast Asia, showing  the 
potential of the economy; 
  (v) most important, the periods of more rapid growth were also the periods of 
the most rapid increase in the income of the poor and reduction in the 
number of poor. 
 
C.  WHAT INFLUENCES PAKISTAN’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
The crucial question therefore is how to increase the rate of growth and, above 
all, the rate of increase in the income of the poor? Historical data provide the most 
useful clues in answering that question. By analysing different time periods in 
Pakistan and the differences between Pakistan and other countries one can approach 
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1.  Savings and Investment 
The ESEA countries have a rate of investment nearly double that of Pakistan’s 
since the 1970s (Indonesia in 1994 was only 50 percent higher; Table 6). If 
investment were used as efficiently in both areas, that would result in a rate of GDP 
growth double in ESEA what it was in Pakistan for much of the period. Since their 
average growth rate was less than twice Pakistan’s, the rate of investment actually 
overexplains all the difference in growth and a simple minded analyst need look no 
further. 
While other factors are addressed below, it is necessary first to explain why 
investment is low. Savings to finance investment have always been low in Pakistan, 
not only compared to the ESEA countries but also to India. Private saving has been 
hampered during many periods by political risk and uncertainty and by the foreign 
exchange constraint. Public savings have always been low or negative, in part 
because of high defense expenditures. Recently increasing debt servicing and subsidy 
costs have added to the public deficit. 
Pakistan has failed to attract substantial foreign private investment to help 
make up for low domestic savings, even in the 1990s. At $ 13 per capita of net 
private capital flows in 1994, it receives only one third of China’s, South Korea’s 
and Indonesia’s  $  39-40  (Table 7).  Thailand  ($ 72) and  Malaysia  ($ 333)  receive 
per capita private inflows 5–26 times larger than Pakistan’s. For many years, 
however, Pakistan has done well in terms of foreign aid. In the 1960s and 70s it was 
around 7 percent. By 1980 it was down to 5 percent, but still a multiple of India’s 
and Indonesia’s 1.3 percent. By 1994 it no longer made a major contribution to 
investment, having fallen to about 1 percent of GDP on a net basis (however gross 




2.  Macroeconomic Stability—The Rate of Inflation 
There is concern now because inflation has been in double digits since 1993-
94. Moreover it has been accelerating. But over its history, Pakistan has been no 
more inflation prone than the ESEA countries (Table 6). This has been true even in 
the decade since 1984 when Pakistan’s inflation rate was quite comparable to those 
of the ESEA countries. 
More important, during their period of most rapid growth (1965–80) both 
South Korea and Indonesia had rates of inflation that substantially exceeded those of 
Pakistan even for the most recent period of rapid inflation. There is evidence that 
hyper-inflation, accelerating inflation or sharp fluctuations in the rate of price 
increase create uncertainties and risk which have negative effects on some forms of 
savings  and longer-term  investment,  especially if  output prices are sticky. They 
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Table 7 
Foreign Private Investment: A Comparative Analysis 




Cap. Flows  
Priv. Cap. 
Flows  




    ($ Bil)  per Capita  ($ Bil)  per 
Capita 
($ Bil)  per 
Capita 
Pakistan 126  1.7  13  0.4(1.1) 4(9)  1.3(.2)  10(1.3) 
India 914  5.5  6  2.0  2  1.5  2 
Bangladesh 118  0.05  0.4         
Thailand 58  4.1  71  2.3  40  5.9  102 
Malaysia 20  6.7  333  5.8  305  6.3  332 
Indonesia 190  7.4  40  4.5  24  6.9  37 
S. Korea  45  8.1  181         
China 1191  46.6  39  38.0  32  6.7  6 
Notes:  1. 1994 population data from World Bank (1996). 
  2. From World Bank (1996). 
  3. Column 2 divided by column 1. 
  4.  Foreign Direct Investment compiled by Jon O’Rourke, USAID/India from World Bank 
“World Debt Tables, 1995” for countries other than Pakistan. From State Bank “Annual 
Report.” $0.4 billion for 1994-95 is probably more directly comparable with other countries; 
$1.1 billion in parentheses is for 1995-96.  
  5. Foreign Indirect Investment which includes net changes in debt and in equity portfolio 
investment also from O’Rouke, except for Pakistan.  For Pakistan, only portfolio investment is 
shown.  It is therefore not strictly comparable. 
 
also introduce inefficiencies. But there is no very persuasive evidence in the history 
of ESEA, or that of South Asian countries for that matter, that the rates of inflation 
which Pakistan has had historically have a negative effect on growth. 
There is excellent evidence, however, that high and accelerating rates of 
inflation harm the poor by reducing the real wages of unskilled workers [Papanek 
(1989)]. It is therefore highly likely that the double digit inflation for most of the last 
6.5 years has hurt the poor. 
A more fundamental issue is the question of what has caused the acceleration 
of inflation and whether it represents a short-term or a structural problem. This is 
addressed below. 
 
3.  The Foreign Exchange Constraint 
Until quite recently it has been painfully evident that Pakistan faced a serious 
foreign exchange constraint. Output from existing investment in industry, and less 
obviously in other sectors, was well below capacity because of a lack of imported 
inputs. Some investment was periodically constrained by inadequate imports of 
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Growth shot up when the constraint was relaxed because exports and 
remittances boomed, and/or foreign aid, foreign borrowing or foreign private 
investment increased. The 1960s were one such period when exports and foreign aid 
both increased. In the late 80s and early 90s growth was also high partly because of 
increased exports. For a while growth can also be high if Pakistan increases foreign 
borrowing. But that process can not continue for long. With the decline in worldwide 
aid flows, aid is no longer a major factor in relaxing the foreign exchange constraint. 
Growth has become increasingly dependent on increasing exports or on attracting 
foreign private investment. 
Over the longer term a crucial factor in the growth of exports is the incentive 
to export. The most important incentive is the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). 
In the 1960s the REER was substantially devalued/improved for non-traditional 
exports by the use of a dual exchange rate, the Export Bonus Voucher Scheme. As a 
result Pakistan became a significant exporter of manufactures. The REER again 
declined from 1985 to 1990 (by 40 percent—all IMF estimates). Manufactured and 
miscellaneous exports more than doubled in 5 years, a growth rate of nearly 15 
percent a year. Between June 1990 and October 1993 the Pakistan government did a 
good job of slowly devaluing the REER despite substantial inflation. It declined by 
nearly 10 percent. Manufactured exports increased by more than 50 percent in 3 
years. Subsequently the REER appreciated 3–5 percent. It thus provided no further 
impetus to export growth, which slowed after 1993. 
An important disincentive to non-traditional exports is the continued strong 
import substitution bias in Pakistan. Although quantitative restrictions on imports 
have been largely eliminated, tariffs continue to be high, despite substantial 
reductions over the last decade. They have recently averaged around 40 percent on 
consumer goods and 35 percent on all imports, giving producers for the domestic 
market an average 35 percent subsidy compared to exporters. Since this incidence 
was calculated by comparing the value of imports with actual duty collections it takes 
account of exemptions. However, it does not take account of smuggling which 
greatly reduces the real subsidy on some, especially consumer, goods. 
Exporters are further handicapped because their costs are increased for 
imported inputs and capital goods by tariffs that have recently averaged around 35 
percent for the former and 45 percent for the latter. The drawback system has not to 
functioned well. Needed bribes reduce its benefits by about 20 percent, according to 
one estimate, and so do delays in receiving the drawback. Therefore these tariffs 
impose real costs on exporters, particularly in commodities where duties are high and 
effective (e.g. steel). 
Moreover there are substantial differences in tariff rates. The highest rates 
have now been brought down to 65 percent while the lowest are zero, in some cases 
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incentives in terms of Effective Rates of Protection (ERP). The most recent available 
study of ERPs is for 1990-91 [Kemal, Mahmood and Ahmed (1994)]. It is likely to 
still be reasonably valid since nominal protection that year was 39 percent on average 
compared to 34 percent in 1994-95. That study showed an implicit effective 
protection rate of 77 percent for manufacturing, which means nearly half (43 percent) 
of the value added was due to protection or implicit subsidy. There was great 
variation in the rate of protection, with some industries taxed and some so heavily 
subsidised that they are actually resulting in a loss of foreign exchange for the 
country. 
The abolition of the export duty on cotton removed a major distortion. The 
subsidy to yarn (and cloth) had led to the tripling of cotton yarn exports and of all 
cotton-based manufactures in dollar terms from 1986-87 to 1994-95 (volumes 
doubled for yarn and cloth). The effective subsidy (ERP) is greatest for industries 
where cotton constituted the highest proportion of total costs. It therefore favoured 
industries which tended to be low value added and which generated fewer jobs than 
might have been the case without such subsidies. Nevertheless a substantial subsidy 
to cotton manufactures could be justified in the 1950s and early 60s on infant 
industry grounds. But for low count yarn and coarse cloth, subsidies had lost their 
rationale a long time ago, since they were infant industries in the mid-1950s. Even 
for garments any rationale for subsidy applied at best to medium and higher fashion 
garments where Pakistan was a newcomer in the international market. But the 
subsidies were, as is so often the case, perverse in benefiting disproportionately those 
who produced well established exports. 
The abolition of the implicit subsidy inherent in the export duty on cotton and 
in control of exports was therefore desirable. But it was bound to have negative 
effects in the short run. When an industry has been subsidised for long then it needs 
time to adjust to the end of subsidies. Some machinery was old, it had too much debt 
at too high a cost, some plants were overstaffed, it had not adapted to changes in the 
market and, above all, it had not been under pressure to be efficient. It required the 
pressure of reduced subsidies to force correction. But until the adjustment was made, 
output inevitably dropped with the end of the subsidy provided by cheap cotton. 
Exporters were also handicapped in competing by wages that were high 
relative to some competitors. The wages of unskilled construction workers in Lahore 
in 1992–1994 were nearly US$ 3 a day. For casual agricultural labour in the Punjab 
they were nearly $ 2. Agricultural labour in Indonesia (island of Java) and 
Bangladesh at the same time received wages closer to $ 1 a day and unskilled 
industrial or construction labour closer to $ 1.5. Wages for unskilled labour in 
Pakistan seem to have been about double those in some competing countries. 
Wage rates matter a great deal in industries where unskilled labour is a high 
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industry. Construction is another, of importance since its costs affect the cost of 
investment throughout the economy. The problem of high wages is compounded in 
Pakistan by constraints on the employment of women. Women’s wages are 
significantly lower than men’s in all competing Asian countries. The effective wage 
in some industries is the wage paid to women (garments, electronics, toys, textiles, 
pharmaceuticals). If women are excluded from some occupations in Pakistan then 
higher men’s wages have to be paid. Labour costs then are a handicap for Pakistan’s 
exporters in some industries. 
Exporters do benefit from some subsidies. The most important in the past was 
the export duty on cotton. The export duty on yarn also helped exporters of cloth. 
Both have now been eliminated. Some subsidy is provided by lower interest rates on 
export finance. If the gap between the market and export rate is about 10 percent and 
loans run for 5 months then this is a subsidy of  4 percent of export value. This is 
modest compared to the Export Bonus Voucher Scheme which provided subsidies of 
20–30 percent or to the average tariff of 34 percent, a subsidy for those producing for 
the domestic market. 
For these and other reasons Pakistan’s exports have grown much more slowly 
than  in  the  rapidly growing  economies of  ESEA  (Table 8), where it was exporters  
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  1970  1993  1980  1994  1980  1994    1980    1994  1994 
Pakistan 0.21 3.6  2.6  7.4 1.3  6.3  16  50  126 
India 0.53  12.2  8.6  25.0 5.1  18.8  7  21  914 
Bangladesh n.a  2.0 0.8  2.7 0.5 2.2  6  19  118 
Thailand 0.03  16.9  6.5  45.3 1.8  33.0  39  570  58 
Malaysia  0.04  20.6 13.0  58.8 2.5 41.1 176 2056  20 
Indonesia 0.02 12.1  21.9  40.0 0.4  21.2  3  112  190 
S.  Korea  0.52  39.5 17.5  96.0 15.8 89.3 415 1984  45 
China 0.24  72.1  18.1  121.0 8.7  98.0  9  82  1191 
Sources and Notes:  1. From World Bank (1995). 
  2. From World Bank (1996). 
  3. Column 2 divided by percent of exports that are manufactures, also from World 
Bank (1996). 
  4. Column 3 divided by respective populations, Ibid. 
  5.  1994 populations from Ibid. Pakistan’s Development  363 
who received the greatest subsidies. Manufactured exports are the largest category of 
non-traditional exports in all of the countries analysed and provide the best index of 
the effect of policies (such traditional exports as oil, raw cotton, jute and rice are 
more affected by fluctuations in international prices). Pakistan’s manufactured 
exports (to OECD countries) increased 17-fold in 23 years, while Indonesia’s 
increased more than 600-fold and China’s 300 fold. That implies a growth rate of less 
than 15 percent a year for Pakistan and more than double that for Indonesia. To put it 
another way, in 1970 Pakistan was just behind Korea in per capita exports of 
manufactures. It led all the countries of Southeast Asia and was far ahead of its 
neighbours. Indeed Pakistan exported as much as China, although it is obviously a 
much smaller country. By 1994 the country was far behind all of ESEA in both total 
and per capita exports. Even India and Bangladesh were catching up. The relatively 
slow growth of exports, due to a lower rate of increase in non-traditional exports, 
was a principal obstacle to more rapid poverty reduction in Pakistan in the medium 
term. 
 
4.  Human Capital Endowment 
There has already been some discussion of the negative effect on growth and 
equity of Pakistan’s poor performance with respect to public health and education, 
and especially the education of women. Table 6(b) provides a stark picture of the 
distance which Pakistan lags behind other countries. All other countries in South 
Asia as well as ESEA had achieved virtually universal primary education by the 
1990s. But Pakistan had only half of its girls in school. The effects of Pakistan’s 
neglect of human capital can be summarised: 
  (a) They contributed to the high rate of population growth which slowed per 
capita growth. Slow growth in turn reduced savings and investment. High 
population growth also meant a high cost of achieving better standards of 
education and health. 
  (b) They raised the cost of labour and especially of educated labour and 
therefore reduced Pakistan’s competitiveness in higher value-added exports. 
  (c) Pakistan therefore is less attractive for foreign investors. 
  (d) Illiterate or poorly educated people find it more difficult to adapt to new 
technology and to a factory environment. 
  (e) Greater illness causes losses in both production and the cost of treating 
people. 
Over the longer term the poor educational and health standards are a crucial 
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5.  Policy—The Efficiency of Resource Use 
A crucial factor in the rate of growth and poverty alleviation is the 
effectiveness of government policy. It greatly affects the efficiency with which 
resources are used. Pakistan had a high rate of growth compared to other countries in 
South Asia and was ahead even of ESEA in the 1960s because it followed effective 
policies during this period. 
The efficiency of an economy is notoriously hard to measure. One very crude 
index is the ICOR, the Incremental Capital-Output Ratio, which indicates how many 
Rs or $ or percent of GDP are required to increase output by one Rs or $ or percent 
of GDP. For long periods of time (the 1960s, part of the 1980s and the 90s) 
Pakistan’s ICOR was 3 or less, indicating that it took investment of 3 percent of GDP 
to increase output or growth by 1 percent of GDP. For long periods of time the other 
countries in South Asia and ESEA had ICORs closer to 4 or even higher. That is, 
some of their advantage in higher rates of investment were neutralised by Pakistan’s 
more efficient use of investment. 
There were several reasons for a lower ICOR in Pakistan: 
  (a) Agriculture tends to have a low ICOR, its growth can be increased at little 
cost in terms of investment if growth is due to greater use of improved 
seeds, application of more fertiliser and of more inexpensive water, 
produced by simple wells rather than large multi-purpose irrigation projects. 
Agriculture in turn was a more important sector in Pakistan than in most of 
the other countries. 
  (b) Much of industrial development in Pakistan was labour intensive, while in 
countries like India (and Indonesia in the 1990s) it was much more capital 
intensive, requiring more investment to produce the same increase in output. 
  (c) The inefficient and capital intensive public sector enterprises were a smaller 
proportion on domestic product in Pakistan than in India, China and, 
recently, Indonesia. 
  (d) During long periods of time Pakistan relied more heavily on market 
incentives than some other countries. Market incentives in labour abundant 
countries result in growth in labour intensive industries and in methods of 
production. They also foster investment in competitive industries. The result 
is greater efficiency than in countries with a heavy reliance on non-market 
incentives through government ownership and control. 
 
6.  The Virtuous Cycles of Growth and Poverty Reduction 
One factor that is often overlooked in the continued rapid growth of ESEA is 
the self-perpetuating nature of the process. Once a country has started to grow 
rapidly it is often easier to continue to grow at a high rate.  Rapid growth: Pakistan’s Development  365 
  (i) tends to increase the rate of savings and investment; 
  (ii) provides incentives to foreign and domestic investment because a rapidly 
growing market is attractive; 
  (iii)  augments the resources available for government investment in 
infrastructure and education by generating more tax revenues; and 
  (iv) reduces poverty and increases the resources available to pacify important 
political groups and can thus contribute to stability, which further enhances 
the environment for investors; all of which contribute further to growth. 
True enough some aspects of rapid growth tend to create problems. The gap 
among regions may grow and so may perceived inequalities as some families become 
obviously wealthy. But deliberate government policy can greatly mitigate these 
problems and rapidly growing economies have the wherewithal to follow such 
policies. Malaysia is an example. The government used the resources generated by 
rapid growth to mitigate the most serious social and political problem, that of ethnic 
tensions. 
Conversely a slowly growing economy finds it difficult to radically accelerate 
growth. Pakistan is unusual in that it had periods of rapid growth which did not lead 
to further growth. They seem to have been terminated in most cases by political 
problems, sometimes exacerbated by economic mismanagement and resulting in 
periods of slow growth. 
One reason for virtuous or vicious cycles of growth is that imbalances and 
problems are interrelated. For instance inadequate savings in Pakistan is in 
substantial part due to political uncertainty and low or negative government savings. 
Low savings contributes to low investment and low growth, which in turn 
discourages foreign private investment. Slow growth makes it difficult to finance the 
needed human capital investment and social sector operating costs. Slow growth also 
means that the economy has a great deal of old and outdated machinery which makes 
it more difficult to export and to compete on the world market. Moreover slow 
growth makes the economy unattractive and contributes to both capital flight and 
brain drain. 
To Sum Up:  Pakistan has had an unusually low rate of savings. Unable to 
attract much foreign private investment, it also had a low rate of investment 
compared to ESEA once foreign aid declined. It has substantially neglected 
investment in human capital. The most serious obstacle to ESEA rates of growth in 
the medium term has been a foreign exchange constraint resulting from a slow 
growth in exports. There have been periods when Pakistan benefited from a virtuous 
cycle of high growth, leading to higher investment, which have shown the potential 
of the economy. During these periods economic management has been better than 
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the potential to grow at “Chinese rates” of 10 percent a year or better. But it has 
never realised that potential. 
 
D.  ELEMENTS OF AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
 
1.  Contractionary Stabilisation or Expansionary  
Stabilisation? 
The structural adjustment to declining inflows of foreign resources can come 
either on the demand or on the supply side or on both. To reduce demand and 
imports is technically easy and can quickly be done, but it imposes hardship and is 
politically costly. It also weakens the base for future growth. Most IMF stabilisation 
programmes are contractionary, in part because the effects are more immediate and 
more readily monitored. 
The more the adjustment is achieved by increasing supply the better for 
society and economy. An expansionary adjustment can quickly be effective if 
substantial waste can be eliminated and idle capacity can be put to work. There is 
quite a lot of both in Pakistan. In the industrial sector a rough estimate is that about 
one third of total capacity is completely idle much, but by no means all, in the textile 
sector. Some of these units can never be put to use, because the machinery is gone or 
because the whole enterprise is bogus. Other firms will take long time to put back 
into operation. But a lot of idle capacity would come back into operation if it were 
profitable. If only one third were to be put back to work in the first year that would 
increase industrial output by 10 percent. 
An equally rough estimate is that units which are now operating could increase 
output also by a third, by working more shifts, more days, adding labour or making 
more of an effort. If only half of this idle capacity could be used then it would add 
another 10 percent to output. So a conservative estimate is that industrial output could 
be increased by over 20 percent in one year if industry is made more profitable. 
There is also potential for quickly increasing the value of agricultural output 
by shifting resources to high value products such as cut flowers and fresh fruit for 
export. Over the longer term much more can also be done to export dried and canned 
fruits (and vegetables). 
 
2.  Making Non-traditional Exports More Profitable 
The rapid growth in ESEA was all export-led. There are good and well known 
reasons for this. The world market is huge, especially for a small exporter like 
Pakistan. Even in commodities where there are quota restrictions rapid growth is 
quite possible—Bangladesh and Indonesia have both gone from zero exports of 
garments to over $ 1 billion in 10 years or less. Indonesia’s shoe exports are also 
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million, one-twentieth). In addition competing in the world market forces exporters 
to be efficient. Unless they receive excessive subsidies they do not waste national 
resources. 
All the ESEA countries provided some form of “subsidy” to non-traditional 
exports. So did Pakistan in the 1960s through the export bonus voucher scheme. The 
country achieved its highest rate of export growth ever during this period. The 
response to the scheme was very rapid and dramatic and there is no reason to think it 
would not be equally rapid in the 1990s if powerful incentives to export were again 
provided. 
 
(a)  Export Subsidies for the 1990s—A Compensated 
Devaluation 
However an outright export subsidy, like the Export Bonus Voucher Scheme, 
is not possible in the 1990s. The WTO and all the developed countries would quickly 
take measures to make it ineffective, by countervailing duties and other measures. 
Even in the 1960s and 70s the East Asian countries provided most of the export 
subsidy by undervaluing their currency. By a “Compensated Devaluation” Pakistan 
can achieve exactly the same result at exactly the same cost as by a direct 
government subsidy to non-traditional exports. 
In a fully Compensated Devaluation the only prices that change are the Rupee 
prices of non-traditional exports. All other prices remain the same. This is achieved 
by lowering tariffs on all imports by the amount required to keep the prices of 
imports from changing. Traditional exports are subject to an export tax which also 
keeps their domestic prices unchanged. 
For example, if the Rupee is devalued from Rs 40/US$ 1 to Rs 50/$ 1, then a 
40 percent tariff would be reduced to 12 percent. Before the devaluation the good 
costs Rs 56 for every $ of import cost (Rs 40 to buy the dollar and Rs 16 to pay the 
40 percent tariff). After the Compensated Devaluation the price would still be Rs 56 
per $ (now Rs 50 to buy the dollar and Rs 6 to pay the 12 percent tariff). Goods with 
a 25 percent tariff would come in duty free and would cost Rs 50 per dollar before 
and after the devaluation. Imports with tariffs of less than 25 percent would either 
have to be subsidised, which might be necessary for such goods as wheat, or would 
need to have other taxes reduced (e.g. petroleum products) or would rise in price. 
A 20 percent export duty on traditional exports would keep their prices also 
unchanged (Rs 50 per $ exported, minus 20 percent = Rs 40). Quite simple principles 
could be established to distinguish traditional and non-traditional exports. For 
instance any commodity exported in substantial quantity for 10 years or more could 
be considered traditional, including low count yarn, coarse cloth and simple T-shirts. 
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non-traditional. Goods in between could be decided on the basis of complexity and 
other factors. 
Under such a fully Compensated Devaluation government would receive less 
revenue from import duty than at present but more from export duty. The initial cost 
to government would be the same as the cost of a subsidy to non-traditional exports. 
But calculations in a number of countries, including Bangladesh, have shown that the 
increased income in the economy as a result of putting idle capacity to work to 
produce exports will generate more revenue than the cost of the subsidy. There will 
be more income taxes from the income generated not only in the exporting industries, 
but also from the firms and workers selling to those industries. With more exports 
there will be more imports and therefore more import taxes. Higher incomes also 
means more sales and excise taxes and so on. 
Note that a compensated devaluation does not reduce the protection available 
to firms producing for the domestic market. A higher exchange rate makes up for the 
lower tariffs. 
Another advantage of the compensated devaluation  is that it sharply curtails 
smuggling. It therefore increases government revenues and actually would provide 
more effective protection to domestic industry than the present high tariffs for goods 
that are heavily smuggled. In  the previous example a smuggler at present buys the 
good at Rs 40 per dollar abroad and saves Rs 16 in tariffs and some Rs 11 more in 
sales tax. He would therefore have up to Rs 27 per dollar  of imports  available to pay 
bribes, the extra  transport costs of smuggling and to keep as profit. After the 
compensated devaluation he would pay Rs 50 to buy the good and would save only 
Rs 6 in tariffs and at most Rs 11 in sales tax or Rs 17 to cover costs and provide  
incentives. That is much less attractive and there will therefore be less smuggling. 
For goods that bear no tariff after the compensated devaluation smuggling would 
obviously no longer pay. 
The experience of Indonesia is most useful, since that country’s economy has 
many similarities to Pakistan. In the mid-1980s it carried out a 60 percent 
devaluation that was only partly compensated. Some tariffs were brought down, 
some export prices were kept stable. But by stabilising the price of rice Indonesia 
kept wages of unskilled workers from rising. The real income of workers did not fall 
by much since their principal item of consumption did not rise in price and other 
goods consumed by them rose by less than the devaluation. But wages and other 
local inputs became much cheaper in dollar or yen terms after the devaluation. This 
provided a major impetus to rapid growth of manufactured exports. 
A compensated devaluation is much more powerful in stimulating exports 
than a traditional, uncompensated one. In the compensated devaluation the Rupee 
value of exports rises sharply but the Rupee cost of labour and imported inputs rises 
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(b)  Other Subsidies/Incentives to Exports 
The effectiveness of the incentive provided by the partly compensated 
devaluation was increased by further steps in Indonesia: 
  (i) A generalised tariff and tax drawback scheme was introduced under which 
exporters were compensated for the tariffs and taxes they paid on inputs. 
The rate at which the drawback was to be paid was set for each export 
commodity. The drawback was paid as soon as it was proved that the export 
of the commodity had taken place. It was not necessary to prove that 
imports had actually been used in the production process or that tariffs and 
taxes had been paid on the imports. Exporters who used domestically 
produced inputs therefore received a hidden subsidy which provided an 
impetus to buying inputs locally and to export the output. 
 (ii)  Drawbacks  were  automatic, they required no bribes and were paid with little 
delay. 
  (iii) Export finance was available at a substantial subsidy compared to other 
loans and received priority from the banks, including a special Export-
Import bank. 
 
(c)  Freeing Imported Inputs into Exports 
Exporters could import without restriction any input they needed for the 
production of exports. The inputs were available at no (or lower) duty. A factory was 
considered as being an exporter if 65 percent or more of its production was exported. 
It could therefore get its inputs more cheaply in some cases than factories producing 
for the domestic market. This provided another hidden subsidy if the plant could use 
some of the imported inputs to produce the 35 percent of goods it was allowed to sell 
in the domestic market. 
 
(d)  No Restrictions on Foreign Investors Producing 
for Export 
In some lines foreign investment was important in gaining access to foreign 
markets and technology. For goods where quality and brand names were important, 
foreign participation and often foreign quality control, were necessary to break into 
the foreign market in the first place. Any foreign investor planning to produce for 
export faced virtually no restrictions. In part as a result of this opening to foreign 
direct investment Indonesia attracted 10 times as much foreign direct investment as 
Pakistan and became seen as a base from which foreign firms served the world 
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(e)  The Effects of Export Incentives 
The increase in Indonesian exports has already been noted. After the reforms 
Indonesian manufactured exports grew at about 25 percent a year for most of a 
decade. This doubling of manufactured exports every 3 years would also stimulate 
domestic production to supply exporting industries and the expanded income of their 
employees. This clearly would make a great difference to the growth of jobs and 
income in Pakistan. 
 
3.  Other Measures to Improve the Functioning 
of the Economy 
A comprehensive reform programme would include many other elements, but 
just 2 important ones will be mentioned here. 
 
(a)  Reduce the Government Deficit 
A major reason for Pakistan’s low savings rate is the large government deficit. 
Strong efforts have been made to increase government revenues, not with much 
success, but little has been done on the expenditure side. Moreover some government 
salaries should be raised to curb corruption, increase tax collection and improve the 
effectiveness of government (see below). To finance these increased expenditures 
while at the same time reducing the deficit other government expenditures will have 
to be substantially reduced. 
A  voluntary early retirement programme can substantially reduce the 
government payroll, especially if there are alternative jobs in the private sector. If 
exports are booming then a good “golden handshake” can induce a number of people 
to leave the government. If government reorganisation is largely financed by 
concessional loans such a programme can pay for itself in 2-3 years. Even if the 
funds necessary to finance the programme have to be borrowed on commercial terms 
the programme can have a high return if it is well designed. 
Of course every reduction in expenditure does double duty. First it saves the 
expenditure itself, then it saves the interest on the borrowing that would otherwise 
have been necessary to finance it. By the magic of compound interest any savings 
become large over time. 
Privatisation of Public Enterprises can do triple duty. First, if the proceeds are 
used to pay off debt then interest costs are saved in perpetuity. Since about 1/3 of the 
budget now covers debt service that saving can be substantial. Second, if the 
enterprise is loss making then eliminating these losses also reduces the deficit. Lastly 
if the enterprise starts paying taxes the deficit is reduced further. 
Reducing corruption can reduce many government expenses. This is 
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Tax reforms are needed not only to raise revenue but to reduce distortions in 
the economy. A shift from relatively high import duties with many exemptions to low 
tariffs plus taxes on traditional exports will have several advantages: 
  — Traditional exports tend to be bulky commodities which it is more costly to 
smuggle, so this will reduce smuggling. 
  — As already mentioned lower tariff rates will also reduce smuggling and other 
forms of evasion. 
  — This implies a general principle which may have wider application: in many 
cases lower rates with fewer exceptions and a wider tax base is both more 
efficient and more equitable. 
  — But the most important step in tax reform is to improve administration. This is 
addressed below. 
 
(b)  Banking Reform 
The need for banking reform is widely recognised. Since the ending of import 
licensing the banks have become in Pakistan, as elsewhere, the principal channel for 
corruption and distortions in the economy. It is important that scarce savings be well 
allocated and not wasted on borrowers who contribute little or nothing to production 
and who spend the money on consumption. 
Privatisation is probably a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reform. 
Privatisation can help assure that: 
  — competition reduces the administrative margin in banking; and 
  — that banks make loans that will be used well, as competition drives out 
improvident banks. 
But it will work only if there is effective regulation which assures that bankers do not 
lend to themselves, their families or to other improvident friends. This is yet another 
area where good governance is important. 
 
E.  THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
There is now a general consensus that government is less effective than private 
enterprise at managing competitive enterprises. But this is true primarily because it 
has proved easier to expose private firms to the pressure of competition and to let 
them fail. In general it is more difficult to expose public firms to competition and 
failure. Some have taken this argument a step further and have contended that the 
best government is the least government. In Pakistan, as elsewhere, governments still 
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1.  The Importance of Government Regulation and Operation 
Governments need to regulate monopolies or operate them, because a non-
competitive private firm is generally no better and can be worse than a private one. 
However, in an economy open to international competition, which Pakistan 
increasingly is, such monopolies are not very widespread. As has been shown 
elsewhere not even all aspects of transportation, communications and power are 
necessarily monopolies. 
Pakistan is using private power generation to deal with a serious shortage. But 
with prices guaranteed there is no guarantee that competition, or the search for 
profits, will force increased efficiency and lower prices. Here as in other fields only 
an honest and competent government can provide some assurance that effective 
monopoly, whether public or private, will not result in inefficiency and excessive 
profits. 
 
2.  Government Provision of Social Services 
In a poor country the market will be even less effective than in a wealthy one 
in providing basic education and health services to all. In Pakistan, where these 
services have been neglected, the role of government is all the greater. 
But there is little justification for the heavy  subsidies of such services for the 
middle class and the rich. There is already a tendency to have private, full charge 
educational and health services for the wealthier groups. But the present system is 
inadequate in several respects: 
  (i) there are still massive subsidies for university education and curative health 
services for wealthier groups; 
  (ii) there are inadequate subsidies for the most intelligent of the poor to get 
quality education, which results in a loss to the nation. This is especially true 
for girls; and 
  (iii)  the basic health and education systems are inadequate. 
To remedy these defects is an appropriate role for government. 
 
3.  Reducing Inequality of Opportunity 
This is part of government’s broader role in reducing the inequality of 
opportunity which exists between rich and poor, urban and rural, educated and 
uneducated, well connected and others. This aspect of the role of government is 
difficult to discharge well in any country, but its importance needs to be recognised. 
 
4.  Strengthen Weak Market Incentives 
It should be emphasised that most ESEA countries substantially subsidised 
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high costs of learning-by-doing and high costs to establish themselves in the world 
market. The first exporters of any non-standardised good from Pakistan will have 
high costs and will need to cut prices to break into the market. In doing so they create 
positive externalities, that is they make it easier for other Pakistani firms to export to 
the world market. 
The high costs of the pioneer exporters include the cost of getting to know the 
market, establishing contracts, assuring the buyer of quality and reliability, 
developing specialised shipping and communications channels and persuading 
buyers that a Pakistani firm can be an appropriate supplier. One only has to think of 
the problems faced by the first Pakistani firm which tries to export TV sets, or 
computers, or switching gear, or fashion garments to realise that there will be 
substantial costs. By the time Pakistan is a major supplier these special costs will 
have disappeared. Buyers naturally look to Pakistan for footballs or low count yarn. 
A new firm will have few difficulties in such traditional fields. In economic terms 
becoming an exporter of a non-traditional good is an activity with strong positive 
externalities. 
All of the ESEA countries used for comparison in this paper recognised these 
externalities and the infant industry arguments which apply to pioneer exporter. Their 
governments heavily subsidised manufactured exports, often by undervalued 
exchange rates and direct subsidies. The latter is much more difficult now, so various 
other measures have been suggested. Whatever the technique, subsidising infant 
industry exports is an important role for government. 
 
F.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM 
Government needs to be reasonably effective and honest to play this important 
role in the economy. But there is an equally important reason why good governance 
is crucial in Pakistan. The country, it has been argued above, faces inevitably painful 
short-term stabilisation and medium term structural adjustment programmes. To the 
extent that both are accomplished by increasing production rather than reducing 
consumption the pain will be minimised, but some pain is bound to remain. 
Stabilisation, to the extent it involves reducing demand, hurts the great majority and 
it hurts the poor particularly [Papanek (1996)]. Reforms generally hurt some groups 
even if they benefit the majority. For government to be able to carry out both 
stabilisation and reforms several factors help. 
 
1.  The Importance of Stable Government 
If government does not expect to be in power long enough to reap some of the 
benefits of stabilisation and reform it will usually be very reluctant to bear the cost. 
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majority in the legislature and were therefore sure of 3–5 years in office (Sri Lanka) 
or were a “grand coalition” with most major groups represented (Malaysia) or had 
both very competent economic management and a difficult economic situation which 
made stabilisation and reform the only viable alternative (India). Other governments 
have been authoritarian, although authoritarian governments have also utterly 
mismanaged the economy (Burma, Indonesia until 1966). 
Stability not only makes it easier for governments to opt for reforms it also 
makes it more likely that the reforms will be effective. Incentives do not work well if 
managers and owners have no idea how long they will last. If policy changes every 
few months it is unlikely to be effective. Pakistan has suffered from uncertainty now 
for some time and the economic costs are substantial. 
 
2.  Allocating Pain and Gain Fairly 
There is good evidence that many people are willing to accept some sacrifice 
if they believe the pain is being shared equitably [Papanek (1986)]. That requires 
curbing the conspicuous consumption of the rich and avoiding sharp declines in the 
income of the poor. 
 
(a)  Curbing Conspicuous Consumption 
The income of the rich is not visible, their consumption inside the country 
usually is very visible. During the kind of period which Pakistan faces it is important 
that luxury consumption be curbed; it is difficult for people to bear hardship if they 
see others continuing to live extravagantly. High taxes on luxury goods and services, 
whether imported or produced domestically, imposed at the same time as other 
austerity measures can therefore help retain support for reform. Indeed during a 
stabilisation period even a brief ban can be justified on the import of especially costly 
cars and other luxuries not produced in Pakistan. 
It is also important to tax luxury housing. That can be done effectively by 
aerial photography, so that taxpayer and tax collector have no contact. 
 
(b)  Supporting the Income of the Poor 
There are many costly and inefficient schemes for supporting the income of 
the poor. If they are not only inefficient but corruptly carried out they will actually be 
counterproductive. The most effective means is to subsidise food which only the 
poor consume, such as low quality imported flour in Pakistan. 
 
3.  Limiting Corruption 
Corruption is usually seen as unfair. It is especially resented if it enriches a 
few while the majority are suffering during a stabilisation period. There are some Pakistan’s Development  375 
useful lessons from other countries which have curbed corruption (very few come 
close to eliminating it). 
 
(a)  Reducing the Incentive 
When government officials have great discretionary powers the incentive for 
corruption is great on both sides of the transaction. By eliminating import licenses 
Pakistan eliminated one of the most fruitful sources of corruption. Bribery will also 
be lessened by lower rates of tariffs and taxes and by leaving to the market rather 
than officials the allocation of loans, land, power, transport, telephone connections 
and most scarce resources. 
Higher pay for government officials most exposed to temptation can 
somewhat reduce the incentive to be corrupt. When government wages are too low 
for survival few will be honest. Indonesia provided a handsome allowance to all who 
collected taxes in order to reduce the incentive to corruption. It helped. 
 
(b)  Increasing the Costs 
If even a few corrupt senior officials lose their job and perhaps go to jail it 
makes it clear that there are serious costs to corruption. Indonesia combined higher 
pay for customs and tax officials with greater penalties and fewer opportunities for 
bribe taking to increase government revenue. 
 
(c)  The Importance of Leadership 
The saying that “the fish rots from the head” is very true. If the Minister is 
known to be honest and determined to punish those who are not, those under him are 
much more likely to be honest as well and this spreads through the Ministry. This can 
be seen most readily in something like tax collection where bringing in an honest and 
effective director can do wonders for revenue. On the other hand corruption also 
spreads from the top down very quickly. 
 
(d)  Reducing the Economic Costs of Corruption 
It is a fundamental principle of corruption that the least costly form of bribery 
is that which only costs what the corrupt person receives. The most costly is that 
which distorts a major part of the economy in order to yield small benefits to the 
corrupt. In countries where corruption has done little damage, contracts, loans or 
other scarce resources are awarded on payment of a bribe only if the contract will be 
competently executed or the scarce resources used efficiently. That is, the bribe 
determines who among a groups of reasonably competent competitors receives the 
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Corruption does more damage if the contract or scarce resource are given to 
less competent persons only because they give a higher bribe. It is most costly if a 
monopoly is established so that someone can derive a profit, but that monopoly 
prevents efficient production from taking place. That is, it is very costly if major 
distortions are imposed on the economy for the principal purpose of giving an 
income to a favoured few. 
One example from an ESEA country was the establishment of a steel 
monopoly to protect an inefficient plant controlled by powerful individuals. As a 
result the country could not develop a canning (tinned goods) industry, because the 
cost of tinplate was too high. The income derived from this whole exercise by the 
group controlling the monopoly was probably below $ 100 million, maybe much 
below. The cost to the country in income and employment foregone was in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars. When the monopoly was ended and the former 
beneficiaries were given a larger amount as commission on government transactions 
they were quite happy. The country developed a canning industry which promises to 
contribute significantly to exports. The amount of corruption has not declined, but 
the country is far better off. 
The most damage is done by predatory corruption. That is, if powerful 
individuals or groups can force successful enterprises to give them a major stake in 
the enterprise. No one will want to invest money or effort in building any large 
enterprises if success only means that you lose control of what you have built. The 
Russian economy is in a shambles in part because corruption has become quite 
predatory. It is a situation to be avoided at all costs. 
 
(e)  Conclusions: Governance and the Economy 
Ideally Pakistan would have a government of Saints, whose only concern is 
the well being of the society and especially of the poor. But even a government of 
sinners can achieve high growth and rapid poverty alleviation, as proved by the 
ESEA countries, if the leadership expects to be in power for a few years and 
recognises: 
  (i) that good economics very quickly becomes good politics, as people are 
better off and government disposes of more resources; 
  (ii) that government must limit corruption and especially assure that it does not 
damage the economy beyond the sums acquired by the corrupt; 
  (iii) that it needs economic competence, a small group that can develop an 
integrated programme of stabilisation and reform that is expansionary, that 
maximises adjustment on the production side and minimises adjustment by 
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  (iv) government needs the courage to implement reforms in its first year in 
office even if they have some short term costs. The resulting growth will 
solve many problems, both political and economic. On the other hand, 
postponing reforms may well force government to impose far greater 
sacrifices just ahead of the next election. 
Reasonably good governance and reasonably competent economic policies 
can give Pakistan a growth rate of 7-8 percent a year, just as it has in some ESEA 
countries. Better governance and economic policy than in some of these countries is 
likely to result in growth of the order of 10 percent and again put Pakistan at the 
forefront of developing countries where it once was. 
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When I was asked to be a discussant on Dr Papanek’s paper, I was given to 
understand that it will concentrate on the lessons of the East and Southeast Asian 
experience on the economic development of Pakistan. Mr Papanek’s present paper 
considerably deviates from that objective. The paper is in fact a very detailed 
discussion of the economic performance, development strategies and opportunities, 
income distribution and poverty, human resources development and a host of other 
economic and social problems faced by the Pakistani economy during the existence 
of the Pakistani state both as it existed in 1947 and as its truncated form after the 
separation of Bangladesh. While this is a very ambitious undertaking. It considerably 
reduces the focus of the paper from shedding much light on the comparability of 
Pakistani development experience with other Asian developing countries, 
particularly East and Southeast Asian economies. The paper also addresses the 
current short-term crisis and stabilisation programmes which Mr Burki’s paper is 
going to discuss later this afternoon. 
Instead of discussing Mr Papanek’s paper as he has structured it himself, I will 
try to concentrate on the strategic linkages between the strategies and policies of 
Pakistan and ESEA countries and how they provide is insights into the differences in 
the economic and social performance. The main feature of the impressive reduction 
in the time period needed to achieve the doubling of their per capita incomes by the 
later industrialising countries. Thus, for example, while Japan took over three 
decades, the Republic of Korea took only a little over one decade to double their per 
capita incomes. China and other Asian tigers, with double digit growth rates have 
further reduced this period. Pakistan and other South Asian countries have taken 
typically two to three decades to double their per capita incomes. 
While the growth performance of these economies has been unquestionably 
accepted as being impressive, the controversy has centred on the basic factors behind 
their success. Questions have also been raised about the uniqueness of their 
experience and the replicability of their experience by other countries. The most 
controversial element in the explanation of the success story of these countries has 
been the role of the state in promoting their development. Early explanations of this 
success story largely presented these economies as being a paragon of private 
enterprise and unfettered market competition. These explanations, which partly 
reflected the cold war polemics about the superiority of rival economic systems, have 
since been abandoned in favour of more heuristic explanations that stress the role of 
market mechanism mainly in relation to the success of these economies in becoming 
large exporters of manufactures, while recognising that the state played an important 
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There is now a better recognition of the role of government intervention in 
these economies for selectively promoting certain industries as being one of the main 
ingredients of success. With the demise of the socialist system of centralised 
planning in the aftermath of the dissolution of Soviet Union and the COMECON 
economies of Eastern Europe, the East Asian economies now provide the only 
remaining viable alternative paradigm to western capitalism. It is no wonder that 
developing economies all over the world, including the transitional economies of CIS 
and Eastern Europe, are keenly interested in learning about the experience of the East 
Asian economies. Many are vying, while most are merely dreaming, to become the 
next Asian tiger or the next “miracle economy”. 
Even the World Bank which published a landmark study on the subject two 
years ago, has grudgingly accepted the challenge to its orthodoxy posed by these 
economies, while casting serious doubt about it replicability and cautioning 
developing countries about the perils of deviating from the Washington consensus 
that emerged in the mid-eighties in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis. The 
only mitigation of its orthodoxy comes in the form of giving up the narrow insistence 
on “getting the prices right” to a plea for the recognition of “basics” or 
“fundamentals”—however, the interpretation of those terms remains a yet unresolved 
issue. 
The East Asian Miracle Report does acknowledge that “In most of these East- 
Asian countries in one form or the other the government intervenes—systematically 
or through other channels”. However, the Report does not consider this to be the 
main explanatory factor of the miracle that these economies have performed. Indeed, 
at one point, it dismisses the claim that there is anything “miraculous” about their 
superior record of growth, which attributes “largely due to superior accumulation of 
physical and human capital”. This, however, begs the question. The real question in 
the debate seems to be whether government intervention did or did not facilitate this 
superior accumulation of physical and human capital. The East-Asian miracle, as 
evidenced by the consistently high rate of growth of these economies and the 
accompanied high savings and investment rates as well as in their emphasis on 
human resource development and export growth, was inseparably linked with the 
micro-level social and economic institutions that exhibit pervasive state intervention. 
Dr Papanek’s paper gives insufficient attention to these institutional 
mechanisms which have sustained growth in the East Asian economies and whose 
absence or weakness in Pakistan has been responsible for the sporadic, unbalanced 
and non-self-perpetuating. What needs to be explored and analysed is which of East-
Asia’s supporting institution has served investment, human resource development 
and exports most effectively and how these institutions could be replicated in 
Pakistan with appropriate modification in its national context. Surprisingly, Dr 
Papanek’s detailed paper on Pakistan’s development experience fails to mention the Comments  381 
weak performance on land reforms, which, contrasts with the radical land reforms in 
East Asia that laid the foundation of East Asia’s high growth. 
The East-Asian lessons that really need to be learnt by developing countries 
such as Pakistan is the need for governments to intervene effectively in the 
accumulation process and in the adaptation of technological innovations. The lesson 
from East-Asian economies is not simply that in order to be successful in competitive 
export markets the developing countries need to lower their wage rates (which many 
of them may be unable to do as wages are already below subsistence level), but also 
to raise productivity by subsidising capital in selected industries. East-Asia 
subsidised domestic investment credit and negative real interest rate on foreign loans 
during the critical development decade. It continues preferential credit and R&D 
support as a measure of protection for struggling industries. Pervasive administrative 
guidance and entrepreneurship as well as their high commitment in human resource 
development and the promotion of a viable education system are among the many 
lessons that Pakistan needs to be encouraged to learn from the experience of the 
successful East-Asian economies. 
Above all, the reciprocal principle of never giving anything away to business 
without stipulating a monitorable performance standard in scale as emphasised by 
Professor Alice Amsden in her book “Korea, Asia’s next Giant”. This highlights the 
essential difference in the role of state intervention as practised in East Asia, in 
contrast to that in other developing countries, especially South Asia. While, contrary 
to the common perception, there is no significant difference in the size of the public 
sector in the economies of East Asia and South Asia, there is a marked difference in 
the quality of such interventions. 
The East Asian economies have used government intervention as an strategic 
instrument in promoting economic development, rather than as an ubiquitous means 
of interference in private economic activity, which characterises its usage in Pakistan. 
The strategic instruments adopted by the East-Asian economies have been used, in 
close concert with the private sector, in choosing the industries to be promoted and 
the incentives to be provided to ensure their competitiveness in export markets. The 
continuation of these incentives have, however, depended on the performance of 
these industries and have not been granted to promote rent-seeking and the 
perpetuation of their infant industry status. In Pakistan, on the other hand, 
government interventions have consisted in granting favour to vested interests and 
without regard to any performance criteria. This has resulted in emergence of 
perpetually “sick” industries from which the governments have been unable to 
withdraw financial support. As a result, these industries, which exist both in the 
private and the public sector, have contributed to a significant portion of rising 
government expenditures in these countries. Such industries have also stood in the 
way of any significant restructuring of the economy from its existing pattern. S. M. Naseem  382 
The structural transformations achieved by the economies of East and 
Southeast Asia is the real reason behind their economic resilience and fast growth. 
No doubt they too accepted structural adjustment packages of the IMF and the World 
Bank in the seventies and eighties to overcome the external shocks. But these were 
utilised towards effecting long-term changes in the economy. In Pakistan, on the 
other hand, the continuous devaluation since the late 1950s and massive doses of 
external assistance have not resulted in any major restructuring of the economy, 
which continues to be heavily dependent on the production and export of cotton and 
its low value-added manufactures, while those countries which do not produce 
cotton, such as Thailand and even Bangladesh have become leading exporters of 
cotton manufactures and garments. 
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